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Comment:
Professor Lea Brilmayer
University of Chicago Law School

on Christina B.
~hitman's "Elevation of Private
Rights to the Constitutional Level "
Commenting

Accepting Professor Whitman's
ch~racterization of the problems
raised by plaintiffs asking for
constitutional remedies where adequate tale remedies also exist, Profe sor Brilmayer analyzed possible
motives for the court's denial of such
redundant federal remedies in recent procedural due process cases.
Such denials, Brilmayer suggest d, ma y be seen as analogous to
the Supreme Court's classical techniques for avoiding constitutional iss_u~s when personal rights of the
ht1gant are not at stake . Like the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and
mootness, denial of federal remedy
on the grounds of redundancy allows
the court to avoid "a djudication of
~ew constitutional rights when there
1s an adequate alternative source of
relief and the motive for seeking a
constit~tional ruling is only the
establishment of far-reaching
precedent."
While many constitutional litigants
seek the articulation of such precede~!, its effect is often to provoke
strident opposition to their cause.
The right-to-life movement. for example, only organized support for a
constitutional amendment to protect
fetal life after Roe v. wa·de . Since
the very attributes of constitutional
decision making which attract
reformers, its conclusiveness and
wide applicability. also tend to fuel
backlash, the court's withholding
a universal federal remedy where
a state remedy is available ma y be
advantageous.
The bar on redundant federal
remedies even more closely resembles three other traditional
avoidance techniques than it does
the doctrines of standing, ripeness ,
and mootn ss. The first of these , the
ex_h~ustio~ doctrine as applied to adm1 n1stra t1ve proceedings and to
habeas corpus, holds "the litigant
may not seek relief unless he
has first utilized a ll available procedures before the administrative
age n ~y. or through the state's postconv1ct1on procedures." Like the
denial of redundant federal
remedies, the exh austion doctrine
makes federal court remedies avai lab le on ly as a last resort.
The seco nd of these traditional
avoidance techniques, the Ashwander rules favoring statutory
rather th an const ituti on al bases for

decision , resembles the ban on
redundant federal remedies in discouraging the Supreme Court's unnecessary anticipation of constitutional issues .
The principle advocating that the
Supreme Court avoid the decision of
a federal issue and let the case stand
on state grounds where there are two
independent and sufficient grounds
for decision, one state and one
federal, also resembles the denial of
redundant federal remedies . " In all
these traditional avoidance techniques , one basis for decision is
preferred over another as less
politically intrusive or doctrinally
far reaching. Similar principles may
underlie the preference for state
rathe: than federal recognition of
tort rights and may have motivated
t~~ Supreme Court to relegate
litigants to state remedies," Professor Brilmayer held.
The benefits of such avoidance of
c?nstitutional questions are offset by
disadvantages . Only in cases where
the state court 's decision is for the
plaintiff is constitutional adjudication avoided rather than postponed .
Other disadvantages also accompany the denial of concurrent
federal claims. The court has not
always managed to avoid addressing
constitutional issues clearly and
completely in such decisions.
Fu~ther_more , " the state remedy
which 1s by h ypot hesis adequate
may not in fact have been presented
to the lower court. " In that event. to
expect either the court to raise and
argue the state remedy. or the defendant to put forth an argument which
requires him to characterize his activities as actionable under state law
is problematic.
'
This suggests that a requirement
for "ex haustion " of substantive
claims ma y not be as workable as the
requirement for the "exhaustion of
preferred fora ." Only time and
future Supreme Court decisions will
clarify whether avoidance of cons_titutional issues is the best explanation for recent denials of supplementary tort remedies .
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